



CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

for **Current Seabasing Capabilities**



*Integrating Seabasing Capabilities
Into Exercises and Experiments*

29 June 2010

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND,
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND,
AND
COMMANDER, ARMY CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION CENTER

Subj: CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CURRENT SEABASING CAPABILITIES

Encl: (1) Concept of Employment Guidelines and Review

Ref: (a) Joint Memorandum of Agreement, Ser N00/158 of
14 Oct 09

1. Purpose. Per the terms outlined in reference (a), enclosure (1) provides a practical approach to Seabasing by compelling Sailors, Marines, and Soldiers to better integrate current capabilities in our training, exercises, and experiments in order to increase seabasing competencies across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Enclosure (1) becomes effective the date this memorandum is signed.


2. Background. Joint Seabasing is a concept that provides a solution to the challenge of conducting joint missions across a range of operations from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. It provides for the application of Naval capabilities by leveraging joint, interagency, and multi-national efforts.


Subj: CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CURRENT SEABASING CAPABILITIES


a. Defense Secretary Gates' guidance has been clear: "A Balanced Strategy," institutionalizing counterinsurgency capabilities and sustaining existing conventional and strategic technological edge.

b. Seabasing is consistent with the Secretary's guidance; it is equally relevant in irregular and conventional warfare by offering scalable, seabased forces operating from sovereign platforms that can affect virtually any problem set.

3. Joint Seabasing is an essential component of our nation's strategic advantage and is a capability combatant commanders are requesting. The time has come to better utilize what we currently have and prepare for emerging seabasing capabilities in order to properly facilitate the employment of joint seabasing in our future operations.


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Foreword

This concept of employment takes a practical approach to Seabasing by compelling Sailors, Marines, and Soldiers to better integrate current capabilities in our training, exercises, and experiments in order to increase Seabasing competencies across the Range of Military Operations.

Joint Seabasing is a concept that provides a solution to the challenge of conducting joint missions across a range of operations from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. It provides for the application of naval capabilities by leveraging joint, interagency, and multinational efforts.



Secretary of Defense Gates' guidance has been clear, "A Balanced Strategy," institutionalizing counterinsurgency capabilities, and sustaining our existing conventional and strategic technological edge.

Seabasing is consistent with the Secretary's Guidance. It is equally relevant in irregular and conventional warfare by offering scalable, sea-based forces operating from sovereign platforms that can affect virtually any problem set.

Joint Seabasing is an essential component of our Nation's strategic advantage and is a capability combatant commanders are requesting. The time has come to better utilize what we currently have and prepare for emerging Seabasing capabilities in order to properly facilitate the employment of joint Seabasing in our future operations.


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Purpose

The *Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities* is to inform operations, training events, exercises, experiments, and capability development.

Scope

This concept of employment (COE) informs personnel on current and emerging Seabasing capabilities. It identifies focus areas for integrating Seabasing capabilities into exercises and experiments with a goal of improving our effectiveness to conduct sea-based operations. It does not define tactics, nor is it doctrine. Rather, this COE serves as a guide for exploring methods that will lead to the refinement of both. Finally, this COE challenges operational forces, research laboratories, capability development organizations, and educational institutions to apply, test, analyze, and refine methods to use existing Seabasing capabilities in the near-term (0-3 years). Lessons learned will still need to be captured and analyzed, and worthy practices incorporated into future capability development, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures.

This COE will be reviewed on an annual basis and updated as mutually directed by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center.

Background

The U.S. is confronted by a variety of strategic challenges and competition for global influence. In

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support of national objectives, joint force operations will be governed by the need to conduct and sustain those operations at global distances. Yet, joint force access to overseas basing will be increasingly restricted by diplomatic, military, infrastructure, geographic, environmental, and force protection impediments. To overcome access challenges, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army have espoused joint Seabasing as a method to provide strategic and operational options in support of diplomatic, military, or humanitarian efforts.

“First, Seabasing is not so much a new “transformational” concept as it is a very old maritime concept whose time has come once again. Accordingly, current planners would do well to carefully consider the history of Seabasing and the lessons derived from it when pursuing contemporary Seabasing capabilities.”

“Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead Slow,” Robert Work, 2006.

A vision for Seabasing is articulated in Service, Naval, and joint conceptual and doctrinal publications. Seabasing supports a range of naval and military missions and tasks – forcible and non-forcible entry operations, amphibious operations, sea control, power projection, Global Fleet Stations (GFS), Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and civil support, etc. – and seeks to provide operational maneuver and assured access to the joint force while significantly reducing the footprint ashore, reliance on port infrastructure, and minimizing the permissions required to operate from host nations’ sovereign territory. It is applicable across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) from presence and engagement to crisis response and major operations.

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The U.S. has been at war for over eight years. The combined stress of a major economic downturn, support to two major campaigns, and re-setting the force, will impact the resources available for investing in capabilities for the future, possibly delaying their procurement. This harsh reality will call for hard decisions in the allocation of resources.

Our shared vision for Seabasing is not changing despite the potential for fiscal constraints. However, we must capitalize on the significant investments we have already made and capabilities we currently have. We will embark on a program of innovation that drives new methods for increasing our ability to transfer equipment at sea, selectively off-load forces, equipment and supplies, and project joint power ashore to support TSC, FHA and foreign disaster relief, crisis response, rapid reinforcement, and other operations. The joint force will integrate Seabasing initiatives into experimentation, training, and exercises, which will enhance its ability to conduct and sustain joint operations globally in restricted access environments in the near-term.

Through Seabasing, we will defeat, or at least mitigate, anti-access/area denial challenges, thereby ensuring freedom of movement and action – not only within the maritime and aerospace domains, but also by merging them with the land domain to significantly enhance the joint force commander's capabilities, options, and flexibility.

Current Seabasing Capabilities

Current Seabasing Capabilities provide the means to operate and sustain forces from the sea. They enhance the core capabilities of seapower as described in A

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Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

Seabasing supports the capabilities listed in that strategy: forward naval presence, power projection, sea control, deterrence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance disaster response.

Likewise, Seabasing addresses the joint force requirement to deploy to unpredictable sites in order to conduct and sustain operations from and across extended distances. As described in the Army Capstone Concept, *Operational Adaptability; Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, current and emerging geographical, political, and military anti-access/area denial challenges will increasingly preclude dependable use of forward staging bases and ports of debarkation.

Seabasing provides the ideal capability to support current combatant commanders' (CCDR) TSC operations with GFS, amphibious shipping, and other assets from and through the sea base. Seabasing supports amphibious operations, disaster relief, crisis response, and rapid reinforcement with a self-sufficient, mobile force capable of conducting rapid and sustained actions while providing support to multinational and interagency efforts.

“Twenty-first century Seabasing will be our nation’s asymmetric military advantage, contributing immeasurably to global peace, international stability, and warfighting effectiveness.”


Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore Jr., USN, and
Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon Jr., USMC, 2003

By synchronizing with other means of force projection, joint Seabasing enables the scalable employment of larger ground forces and capabilities that deploy not

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from but *through* the sea base, thus increasing strategic responsiveness and providing additional force projection and sustainment options to the joint force commander.

Current sea bases may be comprised of individual platforms, Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), Amphibious Readiness Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), Amphibious Forces (AF), GFS, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRON) with embarked Naval Forces, Army Afloat Prepositioned Stocks, and legacy strategic sealift. They may also include joint and coalition naval platforms capable of employing joint, coalition, and/or interagency forces and capabilities. Some of the current Seabasing assets are shown on the next page.



Seabasing capabilities needed, depending on the mission, are *at-sea transfer*, *selective offload*, *austere access*, *sustainment*, *command and control*, *force*

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projection ashore and maritime strike, sea base defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and medical support. Infrastructure, platforms, systems and processes are brought together in various combinations to enable each capability. Current capabilities are enabled by the following:

- **At-sea Transfer.** The ability to move people, equipment, and supplies, between ships to maximize effectiveness of ship loads or prepare forces for projection ashore, has emerged as a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining joint forces from the sea. At-sea transfer is provided by combining interface compatible platforms for surface or air movement within the sea base.
 - Flight decks: Carriers, amphibious shipping, surface combatants, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), combat logistics/Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships.
 - Well decks: Amphibious shipping.
 - Embarked Connectors:
 - Surface: Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), Landing Craft Utility (LCU).
 - Aviation: MV-22, CH-53, CH-46, UH-1, COD.
 - Transfer systems: Roll on/Roll-off Discharge Facilities (RRDF), Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS), and Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) causeway ferries enable limited at-sea-arrival and assembly, sustainment and reconstitution.

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- **Selective Offload.** Selective offload is the ability to access and offload vehicles, supplies, and equipment without a major reconfiguration or total offload to support contingencies while at sea.
 - Recently incorporated Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships have improved limited selective offload capability.
 - New methodologies for loading traditional dense-packed MPS will enhance the ability to support ARG/MEU deployments with additional equipment and sustainment packages.
- **Austere Access.** Joint Seabasing amplifies the historical value of amphibious warfare by confronting an enemy with multiple dilemmas to resolve. It also decreases our own predictability and vulnerability by projecting ground forces ashore through multiple air and seaports and provides joint capabilities to support those forces with extended air and missile defense and fire support. Regardless of military and political anti-access/area denial challenges, many of the locations to which we could expect to deploy simply lack adequate, basic infrastructure. Seabasing mitigates these shortcomings while reducing the need for shore-based sustainment infrastructure and the time required emplacing it.
 - Heavy Lift Vertical Take-off and Landing (HLVTOL), including MH-53E, CH-53E, and CH-47.
 - Shallow-draft, high-speed vessels (HSV).

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- **Sustainment.** The sea base is essential in providing sustainment to the force. Sustainment is the logistics and personnel services required from the sea base to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment across the ROMO. In order to conduct distributed operations in non-linear, non-contiguous environments, sea-based sustainment increasingly will need to focus on distribution directly to the point of need.
 - Underway replenishment:
 - Refueling, ammunition, food, supplies.
 - MSC: Assets for supplies, vehicles, equipment, and refueling to include the Offshore Petroleum Distribution System (OPDS), and the Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System (ABLTS).
 - Connectors:
 - Tactical: LCAC, LCU, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Utility Boat, Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM 8), INLS, MV-22, CH-53, CH-46, CH-47, UH-1.
 - Intra-theater: HSV, Army Logistics Support Vessel (LSV).
- **Command and control.** Command and control provides for the planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of forces and operations in, from, and through the sea base.
 - Tactical Links: Amphibious Command Ships (LCCs), Composite Warfare Commander (CWC), Maritime

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- Operations Center (MOC), MEU, and Interagency.
 - Operational Links: LCCs, MOC, Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Interagency.
- **Force Projection Ashore, Maritime Strike, and ISR.** Force projection ashore, maritime strike, and ISR allow the sea base to influence events on land and in the littorals. Joint forces conduct projection ashore to accomplish a variety of “soft power” and “hard power” tasks within the maritime domain. Strike is conducted to damage or destroy objectives, or neutralize selected enemy capabilities in order to support sea-based operations. Both are heavily influenced by the ISR and CYBER assets contained on or supported by the sea base.
 - Force Projection Ashore:
 - Embarked forces and Adaptable Force Packages (AFPs) to support FHA and foreign disaster relief, civil support, irregular warfare, and theater engagement.
 - Surface and vertical assault assets/embarked forces for crisis response and other operations.
 - Maritime Strike:
 - TACAIR: Offensive, defensive, electronic warfare, C2, escort and assault support.
 - Surface delivered missiles and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS).


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- Sub-surface delivered missiles.
- **Sea Base Defense.** Addressing opposed transit, anti-access and area denial threats requires offensive and defensive actions, including routine protective measures against potential threats, the episodic countering of imminent attacks, and actively locating, neutralizing, or destroying adversary threats that hold our forces at risk in the maritime domain. In order to operate freely, both from and through the sea base, within unstable regions around world [Arc of Instability], maritime superiority and force protection is maintained by surface, sub-surface, mine countermeasure ships and craft [CSG, ESG, Amphibs, riverine craft, and Navy combatants]. Joint land forces will conduct area security operations to deny the enemy the ability to use terrain to threaten our own freedom of movement and access in the air and sea domains.
- **Medical.** Medical support is critical for ensuring the sea-based forces' persistency.
 - Sea base Level of Care:
 - Level 3: Hospital ships.
 - Level 2: Carriers, ARG/MEU/ESGs [Fleet Surgical Teams].
 - Employable Ashore
 - Level 2: Expeditionary Resuscitative Surgical System (ERSS).

Regardless of the scope of the supported operation, military engagement, crisis response, or a major operation, Seabasing may be described using five

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primary lines of operation. The lines of operation are *close, assemble, employ, sustain*, and *reconstitute* (CAESR)¹. These lines of operation may overlap during a campaign as units arrive and others redeploy. The following figure illustrates the Seabasing lines of operation.



The below vignettes will use the five lines of operations construct to describe how Seabasing capabilities have been employed this decade. From that baseline understanding, we will innovate in follow-on futuristic vignettes with current and emerging assets enhancing

¹ The five lines of operation follow and represent an overarching cycle that can accommodate phases of operations from a sea base.

1. Close—the rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis.

2. Assemble—the seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around sea-based assets.

3. Employ—the flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base.

4. Sustain—the persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore through the ROMO.

5. Reconstitute—the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute, and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

Reference NWP 3-62M / MCWP 3-31.7.

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our ability to base at-sea and project forward presence, and when needed, power from a sea-based posture.

Crisis Response: Unified Response



In January 2010, a massive earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale hit the impoverished Caribbean island of Haiti causing catastrophic damage inside and around the capital city of Port-au-Prince. Casualties amounted to 500,000, including an estimated 150,000 deaths, while one million were left homeless. With the main seaport disabled, the small, primary airport, which was also damaged in the quake, quickly became overwhelmed with traffic, resulting in acute and chronic flight/sortie limitations. The quake also devastated the inland transportation infrastructure making ground distribution extremely difficult. These compounding conditions presented the joint, inter-agency, and multinational team with a complex non-hostile, anti-access environment.

- **Close:** USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70), the 22nd MEU embarked aboard USS BATTAN (LHD 5),

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USS FORT McHENRY (LSD 43), USS CARTER HALL (LSD 50), and USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44), the 2/82 Brigade Combat Team of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, and U.S. Air Force Special Operations Air traffic Controllers were dispatched as the leading elements of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) relief effort. With all of the country's hospitals either severely damaged or overwhelmed with casualties, the hospital ship USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) was quickly added to provide a Level 3 floating hospital at the sea base. The salvage ship USS GRASP (ARS 51) was sent to clear the seaport at Port-au-Prince of debris in order to allow ships access to deliver supplies. The MPS USNS LUMMUS (T-AK 3011), which was loaded with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Marine Corps disaster relief supplies and equipment (including heavy civil engineering support equipment to aid in the clearing of rubble and debris, lighterage to transport cargoes ashore, and Army port opening equipment) was sent as well. The 24th MEU, embarked aboard USS NASSAU (LHA 4), USS MESA VERDE (LPD 19), and USS ASHLAND (LSD 48), that was en route to a scheduled deployment in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, was diverted to support Haitian relief operations. Other JIIM forces included, Army and Navy salvage divers, and Navy expeditionary construction and supply distribution forces, as well as Canadian and other UN security forces.

- **Assemble:** In little over one week, over 20 U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, 60 helicopters, 200 vehicles, and 13,000 military personnel (10,000 afloat, 3,000 ashore), along with 43 international

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Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams comprised of 1,739 rescue workers and 161 dogs, were assembled in the joint operations area (OA). U.S. support for this UN-led mission was led by the U.S. ambassador to Haiti, and a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team, with Commander, JTF-Haiti/Deputy Commander USSOUTHCOM, in support.

- **Employ:** Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines conducted a wide range of activities effectively during the HA/DR operation:
 - Operating from the sea base, helicopters and surface connectors delivered relief aid (water, food, and other critical supplies), and security forces to distribution points at or near the point of need, and transported injured survivors to sea-based medical facilities, thereby mitigating the challenge presented by devastated inland transportation infrastructure.
 - Provided surgical and critical care from sea-based medical treatment facilities aboard COMFORT, BATAAN, VINSON, and NASSAU.
 - Provided security for relief operations, to include nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities, secured air drop sites, guarded food distribution sites thereby freeing other UN peacekeeping personnel to patrol and keep order, and also augmented Haitian police patrols providing general security.
 - Cleared debris and provided crane ships in order to open the primary seaport, as well as

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- additional air and sea points of entry and ground lines of communication.
 - Produced potable water for the Haitians using purification equipment on or from the sea base.
 - In addition to the use of aviation assets to support the delivery of relief supplies, and to transport security forces, and personnel requiring medical care, these assets were also utilized to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of damaged infrastructure and potential sites for distribution of relief supplies.
- **Sustain:** Because of the severe damage to the Haitian infrastructure, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines were sustained from the sea base that was supported by Navy and Coast Guard ships including Combat Logistics Force (CLF) and MSC shipping, using underway replenishment (UNREP) at sea capabilities and sea-based helicopters for vertical replenishment (VERTREP) at sea, internal stores of the amphibious ships, and an intermediate support base (ISB) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The sea base allowed forces, logistical support, and humanitarian supplies to flow through the sea base as needed to support the humanitarian operation.
- **Reconstitute:** All afloat and expeditionary forces and equipment were reconstituted for continued peacetime operations.

This vignette demonstrates the demand for and capability of sea-based forces to conduct complex operations under conditions of restricted access.

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Capabilities**

***Military Engagement: African Partnership Station
2007-2008***



Africa Partnership Station (APS) 2007 was a U.S. Naval Forces Europe-led initiative, executed by a multinational staff aboard USS FORT McHENRY (LSD 43) and High Speed Vessel SWIFT (HSV 2). APS was and continues to be an international military engagement effort aiming to enhance regional and maritime safety and security in West and Central Africa. The staff included African, European, and American Sailors, working towards a common goal of partnership in maritime safety and security. This international team trained partners in a variety of military topics, such as maritime domain awareness, leadership, seamanship and navigation, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, civil engineering and logistics, and supported civilian efforts such as work from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

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- **Close:** FORT McHENRY, MPSRON ONE (USNS BOBO and USNS WHEAT), and SWIFT arrived in the operating area from various locations to support the operation.
- **Assemble:** Commander Task Group 60.4 and training teams from various U.S. and European military commands, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations embarked aboard FORT McHENRY to enhance cooperative partnerships with regional maritime services in West and Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. During operations off Liberia, MPSRON INLS causeway ferries, carrying equipment, were taken into FORT McHENRY's well deck and then offloaded on an MPF-Enhanced ship's RRDF for assembly at sea.
- **Employ:** FORT McHENRY brought international training teams to Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, and supported more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in addition to hosting information exchanges. During operations off Liberia, causeway ferries moved equipment, vehicles, and personnel (after assembly) from FORT McHENRY to a MPSRON RRDF for transfer to SWIFT for movement ashore. The sea base ensured secure platforms at sea that provided force protection, limited footprint ashore, and flexible interface with intra-theater support assets.
- **Sustainment:** FORT McHENRY was sustained for five months while operating in the littoral region of West Africa by SWIFT and Combat Logistics Force (CLF) shipping from Commander Task Force (CTF)

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63, enabling sustained presence in support of this important international cooperative maritime effort.

- **Reconstitute:** After every maritime security and training operation in each African country, FORT McHENRY reconstituted its personnel and assets and redeployed with full compatibility, retaining its flexibility for further tasking from the CCCR.

As shown in this vignette, Seabasing provides the capability to support TSC objectives by allowing for the movement and employment of forces from the sea base.

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Major Operations: Task Force 58 Operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom



Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) exemplifies naval power projection from a sea-based posture. Joint forces conducted significant strike and force projection ashore missions using Seabasing principles to the maximum extent possible for a penetration deep inland.

- **Close:** Immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, the USS VINSON, STENNIS, ROOSEVELT and ENTERPRISE carrier battle groups (CVBG), with a mix of Navy and Marine squadrons embarked, were directed to the North Arabian Sea. The USS KITTY HAWK battle group also deployed to support initial OEF operations, but instead of her full Carrier Air Wing, she carried over 1,000 joint Special Operations Forces personnel, including the Army's 160th Special Operations

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Aviation Regiment, Navy SEALs, and Air Force Special Operations Forces. Also in September, the 15th MEU (SOC) and the PELELIU ARG were training in Australia as part of their forward presence mission when they were directed to make best speed to the North Arabian Sea. En route, they managed to accomplish their preplanned civil-military operation in East Timor. In mid-November, the 26th MEU (SOC) and the BATAAN ARG, diverted from the Mediterranean and closed to the assembled sea base.

- **Assemble:** 26th and 15th MEU (SOCs) aggregated with a flow-in headquarters to establish Task Force (TF) 58.
- **Employ:** Joint forces conducted a wide-range of forcible entry and power projection missions almost 450 miles away from a sea base.
 - Navy and Marine Corps fighter/attack squadrons from four CSGs conducted extensive strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets.
 - Navy Special Warfare Teams projected ashore from the sea base with controlled strike missions against numerous targets.
 - TF-58 opened a second front in the south by commencing the longest ship-to-objective maneuver in history, moving 400 miles inland to seize the desert airstrip south of Kandahar. Renamed “Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rhino,” it supported the introduction of additional joint forces as well as the isolation and the eventual seizure of Kandahar.
 - TF-58 conducted sensitive site exploitation in support of counter-proliferation as well as

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continued strikes and raids. These tasks were accomplished through the integrated application of TF-58's organic combat power, carrier air, strategic airlift, and cooperation with special operations forces, operatives from other government agencies, and anti-Taliban forces.

- **Sustain:** Long-range and medium-to-heavy lift vertical capability was critical to sea-based support. TF-58 sustainment had to traverse long-distances while maintaining a very small foot-print in Pakistani territory. Sustainment from the sea base included fuel, ammunition, food, water, construction materials, repair parts, and services (medical, dental, postal, and administration) for two reinforced battalions and supporting combat elements.
- **Reconstitute:** In January 2002, forces from the 15th and 26th MEU (SOCs) re-embarked on their amphibious shipping after being relieved in place by the 101st Airborne Division. Within a one-month period, both MEUs reconstituted afloat and redeployed for follow-on tasking.

Future Scenarios – Joint Seabasing in an Era of Persistent Conflict

From the above historical vignettes we have a baseline understanding of our current ability to base at-sea and project forward presence and when needed power from a sea-based posture. The following notional vignettes describe how joint forces might conduct Seabasing with current and emerging capabilities. They are intended to provide, in operational context, the 'art of the possible' to help focus near-term Seabasing innovation.

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Irregular Warfare

The African country of Bafonga is a nation with an extensive littoral containing significant energy resources and infrastructure. Triggered by a weak central government, a national economy in ruins after a decade of government mismanagement, widespread religious and tribal frictions, and environmental damage caused by the energy industries, extreme violence erupts in the summer of 2012. Organized criminal organizations are cooperating with anti-government insurgents to control significant areas within the southern portion of the country. Key energy infrastructure, both off-shore and on-shore, has been under attack and either damaged or taken by criminal elements. Arms are smuggled in through the littorals and via traditional cross border smuggling routes. Notably, the insurgents and criminal organizations have been able to procure surface to air missiles, a small number of anti-ship missiles, guided mortar rounds, rocket propelled grenades, and a number of unmanned aerial vehicles. The insurgents use mainly terror and guerrilla tactics—to include assassination and intimidation, car and suicide bombs, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, sabotage against energy facilities and pipelines, and hostage-taking. However, they maintain the ability to combine those tactics with sophisticated precision weaponry. Pirates also use waterborne attacks by small craft disguised as fishing boats against shipping in the gulf and narrow waters of the river system.

The Government of Bafonga (GoB) officially requested international assistance to help counter the insurgency. The United Nations passed an emergency resolution authorizing foreign support efforts. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) establishes Joint Task Force Bafonga (JTF-B) to protect U.S. and western interests

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within the delta area of Bafonga, and to assist GoB forces to counter the destabilizing threats from insurgents, pirates, and criminal elements against its infrastructure. Due to the fragile condition of the GoB, a historical mistrust of foreign militaries by the Bafongan population, the lack of infrastructure ashore, and the potential vulnerability of static positions ashore, the joint force footprint ashore must be minimized. Seabasing of forces and capabilities to conduct operations will be exploited to the maximum extent possible.

Mission: JTF-B assists the GoB to restore stability and security within its sovereign border and adjacent waters to promote stability in the region.

- **Close:** JTF-B immediately closes a CSG from the Mediterranean Sea and redirects an ARG/MEU that was en route to the Northern Arabian Gulf. Other response forces are a MEB-sized amphibious force (AF) integrated with an MPF (Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier (T-AKE), an LMSR, and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) containing enhanced C2 and berthing, an RRDF and INLS), a Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), a U.S. Army LCU 2000, an LSV, and a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
- **Assemble:** Initial response forces and equipment arrive at the sea base on platforms with organic capabilities to support movement of materiel and personnel in support of operations ashore. Marine forces and interagency personnel flown to an advanced base move via JHSV to link-up with the MPF and associate with prepositioned vehicles and equipment. Cargo, equipment, supplies, and personnel are transferred for assembly at the sea base via surface connectors (LCAC, LCU, RRDF,

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INLS, and JHSV) and air connectors (MH/CH-53, MH-60, and V-22) for further employment.

- **Employ:** From primarily a sea-based posture, JTF-B conducts extensive ISR to locate anti-ship missiles and destroy them by aviation strikes, amphibious raids, and special operations. With a reduced but not totally eliminated threat, U.S. and GoB forces commence operations within the engagement envelope. Joint/multinational operations conducted with interagency partners include: Vertical and surface assaults to secure and control energy infrastructure, security operations at critical energy nodes, maritime intercept, maritime security, aviation strike and special operations forces raids against precision weapons and high value targets, security forces, foreign internal defense, and riverine operations to secure specified waterways. The sea base provides capabilities to task organize forces for the missions, and project them to designated target areas. The preponderance of command and control, logistics, fire support, maneuver assets, and medical support remain at sea and are projected to points of need as required.
- **Sustain:** Immediate and first response forces deliver a level of support and sustainment that will support advance force and initial operations. The arrival of the AF increases force sustainment. CLF assets are utilized as shuttle ships to resupply the sea base with consumables and other essential commodities as stocks diminish. JHSV and LSV are used as intra-theater connectors for both sustainment and reinforcement as required. A combination of assets will support ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore sustainment operations. LCAC and LCUs are used

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for well-deck operations, and INLS and RRDF provide capabilities for non-well deck at-sea transfer. Conducting rapid at-sea off-loads, MPF with its T-AKE, LMSR, MLP, INLS, and RRDF supported by LCAC, LCU from the ARG/MEU and AF, provides the capability to rapidly reinforce and sustain operations ashore without the need for sea ports of debarkation.

- **Reconstitute:** Over the course of the operation, forces and equipment are continuously recovered to the sea base, and readied for further tasking. Much of the equipment can be brought to ‘full mission capable’ status with sea-based limited maintenance facilities. For items that cannot be repaired at sea, they are transferred to a JHSV for transport to the advanced base. Equipment and replacement personnel arrive at the sea base via JHSV or V-22. As the situation stabilizes, the ARG/MEU is regenerated from a combination of MPF and CLF stocks before detaching for subsequent tasking.

Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

During 2015, an Army brigade-level combined arms team deploys for a 6-month rotation to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations within the coastal areas of Zardoz in support of a sustained engagement mission. Midway through this deployment, increasing insurgent activity heightens political and force protection concerns. Insurgent forces increase violence/terrorism in Diablo, the capital, and Port Frances, the second largest city in Zardoz, as a feint to draw Government of Zardoz (GoZ) forces from the Easter River delta. The U.S. State Department orders the evacuation of the 25,000

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American citizens (AMCITS) living mostly in Diablo and the Easter River delta. After insurgents shoot down a USAF C-17 and a commercial airliner during take-off in Diablo, all commercial air service ceases. The CCDR requests the Navy establish a sea base in order to support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

Mission: The CCDR will establish JTF-Zardoz (JTF-Z), and the Joint Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) will develop a sea base in the vicinity of the Easter River delta in order to secure AMCITS, stabilize the Easter River delta infrastructure.

- **Close:** Deploy one Army and one Navy JHSV, an LSV, and an LCS to the Gulf of Zardo, just off the coast of Zardo. Self-deploy 1x EUCOM-based Army vertical heavy-lift (CH-47) aircraft squadron to an ISB established in Papitina, Papitina is a neighboring country, which has port facilities in the Gulf of Zardo, and is approximately 200 miles by aircraft from Diablo. Papitina has deep water port facilities in the town of Regarlia, which is approximately 150 miles from Port Frances. A second CONUS-based squadron will be delivered to an ISB in Regarlia for further deployment. Alert 1x EUCOM-based Army Infantry (Airborne) Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and deploy a second, CONUS-based BCT to Ramstein Air Base for further deployment. Alert 1x Army Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) BCT, 1x Army Infantry (Air Assault) BCT Task Force, Strategic Sealift, and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) vessels. Deploy one ARG/MEU from the eastern Mediterranean Sea to Gulf of Zardo. Alert 1x MPSRON and associated CONUS-based MEB.

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- **Assemble:** Develop the sea base with ARG/MEU, JHSV, LSV, and LCS assets, as well as via direct employment (through the sea base).
- **Employ:** With LCSs providing force protection, ARG/MEU assets, the JHSVs and the LSV, and U.S. Army vertical lift commence NEO, shuttling evacuees from safe haven locations in Diablo and Port Frances to the sea base. From the sea base, JHSVs and vertical lift assets will transport the evacuees to the safe haven at the Papitina ISB, and will turn the evacuees over to Department of State representatives. The Army combined arms team and MEU provide wide-area security by conducting decentralized, distributed operations to secure an Evacuation Control Center (ECC), evacuation routes, and ports of embarkation. They also provide intermittent perimeter security for the main commercial airport in Diablo (Hasela Azid International Airport) to enable coordinated NEO via military airlift. Small numbers of GoZ forces augment U.S. forces.
- **Sustain:** Army and Marine Corps small units conduct decentralized, distributed operations directly to point of use via ARG/MEU and Army air and surface connectors, augmented by JHSVs and the LSV when possible.
- **Reconstitute:** Reconstitute all expeditionary forces and equipment as the operational situation allows; the Army combined arms team transitions back to its original sustained engagement mission.

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Support Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Zardoz insurgent forces mount concerted campaigns in Diablo and Port Frances as a feint to draw GoZ forces away from the Easter River delta, thus facilitating a main thrust to seize control of the infrastructure located therein. Concerned over growing political instability, the GoZ shifts forces to Diablo and Port Frances and requests that U.S. forces conduct COIN operations to secure the Easter River delta region, thus preventing potential destruction and/or disruption of production and global distribution.

Mission: JTF-Z will continue to support NEO and COIN in the vicinity of the Easter River delta region in order to secure AMCITS, stabilize the Easter River delta region, and protect infrastructure.

- **Close:** Retain the sea base (ARG/MEU, JHSVs, LSV, and LCS) and deploy additional JHSVs and LCSs. Deploy alerted MPSRON and lead elements of the MEB (Off-load Preparation Party (OPP), etc.) to the Papitina ISB. Deploy Army Air Assault TF via AFSB and GCV BCT via Strategic Sealift from CONUS to Zardoz AO; Maintain EUCOM-based Army Airborne BCT, Army Stryker BCT, and (upon arrival from CONUS) the vertical heavy lift squadron on alert for deployment to Zardoz OA.
- **Assemble:** Augment the original sea-based forces (ARG/MEU) with the AFSB-based Army Air Assault TF, as well as through direct employment (through the sea base) of the MEB using surface and air connectors via MPS, RRDF, and MLP, and the Army Airborne BCT via airdrop and the GCV BCT via Strategic Sealift.

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- **Employ:** JHSVs, LCSs, and the LSV sea- and shore-based air and surface connectors, along with the Army combined arms team supported by a small number of GoZ forces, continue NEO, while the bulk of GoZ forces focus on maintaining security in Diablo, Port Frances, and other inland cities in order to maintain political stability. Upon completion of NEO or when directed, the distributed elements of the MEU and Army combined arms team aggregate in vicinity Port Frances in the Easter River delta region to commence COIN operations. The MEB, sea-based Army Air Assault TF (embarked aboard AFSB from CONUS), the Army Airborne BCT from Ramstein Air Base (employed via air drop) and GCV BCT from CONUS (employed via Strategic Sealift) provide rapid reinforcement. These units conduct decentralized distributed COIN operations to secure the Easter River delta oil region and provide wide-area security for the local population.
- **Sustain:** Sustainment of Marine Corps and Army small units conducting distributed operations ashore is provided via JHSV, LSV and vertical heavy lift shuttle from the sea base. Resupply of the sea base will be supported via CLF assets as well as the JHSVs and LSV.
- **Reconstitute:** Upon completion of Army GCV BCT off-load, the Strategic Sealift vessels return to CONUS to support deployment of additional forces. MPF assets remain on station as part of the sea base. As the operational situation allows, reconstitute all afloat and expeditionary forces and equipment. The Army combined arms team transitions back to its original sustained engagement mission.

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Focus Areas for Exercises, Experiments, and Near-term Innovation.

A current list of Seabasing related exercises, testing, and training events is included as Enclosure 1, followed by a list of actions to consider for future Seabasing events in Enclosure 2. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planners will incorporate Seabasing objectives into the events listed in Enclosure 1 and any other fleet and amphibious training and exercise programs, as well as into near term experimentation. The goal is to maximize the utility of existing and emerging Seabasing capabilities. By leveraging any potential improvements in the manner that we employ MPF, for example, we could optimize our current capabilities. The Fleet and Marine Forces' exercise schedules and Seabasing experimentation events in the enclosure highlight the kinds of opportunities we need to exploit for both the wargaming discoveries and operational lessons learned in practical ways. Exercise programs, such as *Western Africa Training Cruise* (WATC), and *Bold Alligator*, provide a means to maximize merging innovation with baseline training. The *Bold Alligator* series of exercises provides a venue to reinvigorate amphibious operations, and provides numerous opportunities to explore Seabasing capabilities. Additionally, *Bold Alligator* enables the execution of the warfighting functions from a sea-based posture. All of these types of training and exercise programs, and experimentation will allow identification of best practices for reinsertion in follow-on events, leading to validation and the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), ideas for science and technology investigation and research, and development initiatives to drive future materiel solutions.

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The near-term focus areas across CAESR are: at-sea transfer, selective off-load, command and control, and amphibious operations. Additionally, the United States will continue to be threatened by a variety of state and non-state adversaries, current and emerging who will attempt to deny or impede access. Our national interests in the maritime domain are also increasingly threatened by terrorists, transnational criminals, and pirates. Such irregular actors exploit the vastness and complexity of the maritime domain to avoid detection and neutralization, necessitating improvements to global maritime awareness. They highlight the need for greater capability and capacity to confront irregular challenges in the littorals. Naval forces must be capable of sustaining resilient sea-based operations when access is not guaranteed. Until advanced, austere-access capabilities are developed and fielded in adequate quantities, employing the bulk of Army forces will require developed air and sea ports that must be secured by assault forces requiring practiced planning and coordination, in order to ensure successful employment and transition of command and control of joint forces. The outcome of all these efforts should result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and/or facilities (DOTMLPF) changes. Specific items to pursue are:

- **Doctrine**
 - Conducting combined arms forcible entry operations involving both Army (Airborne) and Marine Corps assault forces.
 - Integrated air and missile defense (land, sea, aerospace).
 - Common processes for distribution, maintenance, and medical support.

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- Review NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, *Seabasing*, for potential updates.
- Examine tasks and procedures for the emerging Vehicle Transport System (VTS) to determine interoperability with current Seabasing platforms.
- Participate in the revision of JP 4-01.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS)* that is currently being conducted by USTRANSCOM.
- **Organization**
 - Constructs for managing the battlespace during naval, joint, and multi-national Seabasing and amphibious operations.
 - Constructs for Seabasing various sized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and joint staffs.
 - Incorporate amphibious assault ships (LHD/LHA) and strike platforms into MPF exercises to refine or develop naval, joint, and multi-national command relationships to support theater engagement, crisis response, and other operations.
 - Identify the communication requirements in support of theater security cooperation to include GFS operations.
 - Constructs for integrating multi-domain air and missile defense.
 - Constructs for coordinating inter-Service sustainment issues.
 - Constructs for integrated Navy, amphibious and afloat preposition ship mixes that support engagement activities, extended irregular warfare operations and crisis response.

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- Combine HSV-2 SWIFT, and when available JHSV, with MPS, RRDF, INLS, and amphibious ships and connectors to conduct the at-sea arrival and assembly, selective off-load, and sustainment of a MAGTF and/or Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) AFPs.
- **Training**
 - Mission essential tasks for the sea base (examples: Fleet and Marine exercises, composite training, unit exercises, etc).
 - Seabasing certification processes.
 - Indoctrination and incorporation of CAESR during training missions and exercises.
 - Employment of sea-based forces for engagement, crisis response, and power projection.
 - Regularly scheduled and funded Fleet and MEF Seabasing planning, staff training and exercise program.
- **Materiel**
 - Continue to examine, within current resources, joint HVTOL capabilities to conduct mounted vertical maneuver from the sea base.
 - Continue to examine, within current resources, capabilities to conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances.
 - Continue to examine, within current resources, methods to permit selective onload/offload of selected equipment, personnel, and supplies from surface platforms (including commercial and MPS) to include cargo transfer at-sea.

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- Continue to examine, within current resources, capabilities to conduct at sea arrival and assembly.
- Investigate the interoperability of Improved INLS with the RRDF employed by the Army.
- Investigate interoperability of Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) 3 assets.
- Continue interoperability experimentation.
- Address the retirement of Navy MH-53E; validate requirements for vertical heavy lift assets to support sea-based operations.
- **Leadership and Education**
 - Participate in Seabasing briefing given to CCDRs' staffs and allied/multinational partners.
 - Incorporate coordinated Seabasing input into course content review boards at service-level educational institutions.
 - Examine command and control and interoperability issues in Service Title 10 wargames, and other wargame venues. Expeditionary Warrior 2010 (EW 10), the USMC Title 10 wargame, explored both of these issues and the results will be posted at <http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/index.htm>.
 - Incorporate Seabasing planning and wargaming exercises within applicable Intermediate Level Schools, Advanced Warfighting and Top Level School curricula.
- **Personnel**
 - Refine NECC AFP personnel requirements and ship mixes to support TSC operations on platforms such as JHSV and LCS.

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- Interoperability of current sea base capabilities to support AFPs.
- **Facilities:** Currently, no facility issues exist to explore.

U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center will take the lead to develop a strategy to incorporate these DOTMLPF items into future exercises and experimentation. Commitment to sea-based exercise events will lead to an improved ability to *close* the force, *assemble* the necessary personnel and equipment from a variety of assets, *employ* the force to mission objectives ashore, *sustain* the force from the sea base, and *reconstitute* personnel and equipment at sea upon mission completion.

Interoperability

Developing and executing exercises in which there is joint, multi-national, and interagency participation in peacetime enables stronger partnerships during war. We must include likely partners in our efforts to develop enhanced Seabasing capabilities and TTPs. Some specific interoperability challenges that need addressing are:

- Integrated, multi-domain air and missile defense.
- Seabasing support to Army light, medium, and heavy brigade operations.
- Interoperability and maintenance of Army helicopters.

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- Interoperability and maintenance of Army water craft.
- Interoperability of Army prepositioning ships' ramps and cranes with naval vessels.
- Universal total asset / in-transit visibility throughout the supply chain / distribution enterprise.
- At-sea transfer between U.S. and multi-national vessels (commercial and military).
- Joint, interagency, and multi-national C5ISR compatibility and information sharing with naval systems and standardized tactics, techniques and procedures.
- Integration of joint and multinational Seabasing capabilities.

Emerging Seabasing Capabilities

Emerging Seabasing capabilities are funded and have a projected delivery date to the operating forces within the next five years.

- **Joint High Speed Vessel:** The JHSV is an intra-theater and tactical level connector that will provide critical transport of supplies, equipment, and personnel to austere or damaged ports. The vessel will support our Seabasing sustainment capability, enhance at-sea transfer with its ability to interface with an RRDF in calm water and low sea state, and move forces and equipment throughout a theater. With an embarked force or AFP, JHSV is also employable as a GFS.

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- **LCAC-service life extension program (SLEP):** LCAC (SLEP) will maintain the current LCAC capability while the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) is being developed, and introduced into the Fleet.
- **Littoral Combat Ship:** The LCS, with its open mission bay, supports theater engagement, and can act as a GFS or TSC platform. When configured with its mine warfare, littoral anti-submarine, or small boat/anti-surface ship mission packages, LCS will enhance sea base defense and maneuver capabilities.
- **MPF Mobile Landing Platform.** The MLP is based on a commercial Alaska oil tanker hull form, and is a Float-On/Float Off (FLO/FLO) vessel that will significantly improve at-sea transfer of personnel, equipment, and sustainment for delivery ashore via surface means. The vessel will also provide a limited at-sea arrival and assembly capability. The MLP will have large mooring fenders for ship-to-ship “skin to skin” transfer, a side port ramp, reconfigurable mission deck with a vehicle staging area, and surface connector mission bays. One MLP will be integrated into each MPSRON.
- **MPF T-AKEs:** Three T-AKEs, one per MPSRON, have been funded and are in addition to those already procured for the Combat Logistics Force. These T-AKEs, in combination with three LMSRs, three MLPs, and other prepositioning assets, will provide selective offload and sea-based sustainment capabilities when conducting integrated amphibious and maritime pre-positioning operations.

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- **Heavy Lift Helicopter (CH-53K):** The CH-53K is the programmed replacement for the CH-53E. It will provide sea-based logistics support to Marines and joint forces.

Envisioned Capabilities

The Envisioned capabilities below are those refinements and potential new concepts that will further enhance the portfolio of Seabasing capabilities across the five lines of operation. While important to the overall picture, we have not included envisioned capabilities associated with FORCEnet, Sea Strike and Sea Shield in order to maintain a logistical focus. The below envisioned capabilities do include potential enhancements that are funded for experimentation. They should be incorporated into the training and exercise program as soon as available. The following envisioned capabilities could improve:

- **At-sea transfer:**
 - **JHSV Sea State 3 Ramp:** A new ramp being developed to improve the current ramp design by allowing an RRDF interface at sea state 3. (NAVSEA, OPNAV N85 signed Technology Transition Agreement (TTA) with ONR, Oct 2008.)
 - **Air Cushion Vehicle–RRDF Interoperability:** This provides the ability for an LCAC to interface with an RRDF to support offload of MPS. (Proposal for TRANSCOM R&D, proposed MPF enhancement.)
 - **Large Vessel Interface Lift-on/Lift-off (LVI LO/LO):** The LVI LO/LO is a

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stabilized crane system that will enable at-sea lift-on/lift-off transfer capability to sustain the sea base.

- **Small-to-Large Vessel At-Sea Transfer (STLVAST):** The STLVAST dynamic positioning system is compact, modular and based on an open architecture systems that enables safe and effective vessel interfacing. (Transition to PMS 385 in 3rd Quarter FY10.)
- **Advanced Mooring System (AMS):** The AMS will provide for the automated mooring and positioning of lightweight connectors, such as the JHSV, and high flare container ships along sea-based platforms through the use of sensors, control algorithms, and responsive actuators through sea state 4.
- **Selective offload:**
 - **High Rate Vertical/Horizontal Material Movement (HRVHM):** The HRVHM represents technologies to enable seamless end-to-end internal shipboard movement of material (various sized cargo, packages, pallets, and weapons) onboard a variety of naval vessels. (Transition to PMS 385 in 4th Quarter FY10.)
 - **Shipboard Selective Access and Retrieval System (SSARS):** An omni-directional device that optimizes vehicle and container loading, storage, and retrieval for employment.
 - **Intra-Connector Material Handling (ICMH):** The ICMH is a lashing system designed to decrease load time for LCAC

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and SSC. It consists of automated tensioning devices that speeds the loading process and ensures cargo is consistently and adequately secured for surface transport. (Transition to LCAC/PMS 377 R&D in 3rd Quarter FY10.)

- **Austere Access:**
 - **Mounted Vertical Maneuver:** A form of maneuver requiring insertion/extraction of medium weight armored forces to objectives without the need for fixed airports, airfields, or prepared airheads via Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL).
 - **Sea Train/Joint High Speed (Austere Access) Sealift:** Provides a means for the rapid employment, from strategic distances, of large, unit-configured formations (troops and equipment) and integrated sustainment through unimproved or degraded ports for immediate employment without reliance on intermediate staging bases, via ONR and NAVSEA funded Sea Train science and technology (S&T) initiatives.
 - **Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (CUAS).** Will provide for vertical resupply of units operating in distributed environments requiring precision resupply capability in order to minimize loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies on ground resupply missions, and to alleviate a portion of the logistics burden on rotary wing assets.

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Conclusion and Way-Ahead


We have been developing our Seabasing capability for decades. Challenges remain for maximizing its utility. We must immediately start to aggressively exercise our current capabilities and prepare to incorporate the emerging capabilities. To meet our Seabasing challenges, we will take the following actions:

- Become better versed with our existing Seabasing capabilities and work to better utilize them while identifying critical gaps.
- Gain an understanding of emerging capabilities and how they can be integrated with our current capabilities.
- Incorporate Seabasing objectives into training, exercises, and experiments in order to inform the force development process.
- Execute events, additional research and development, and capability demonstrations.
- Capture and catalogue best practices and lessons learned.
- Refine and revise DOTMLPF.
- Coordinate development of a Joint Seabasing Technology Exchange Board.

In the anticipated fiscal environment, the risks are too great to let opportunities to enhance our Seabasing capabilities bypass us.

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Capabilities

ENCLOSURE ONE: SEABASING DOTMLPF



Above Seabasing DOTMLPF indicators are but a sample of historical and forecasted delivery dates of Seabasing DOTMLPF indicators, assets, exercises and training events. More opportunities can be identified with continued coordination between USFFC, MCCDC, and ARCIC. Enclosure 2 is provided to help the operator build and develop future exercises and test events that support writing and evaluating Seabasing DOTMLPF changes.

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**ENCLOSURE TWO: BASIC PROCESS FOR
DEVELOPING SEABASING CAPABILITIES**

The outline below provides a framework to identify or refine tasks, expand capabilities, and inform potential DOTMLPF Change Recommendations (DCR).

- Develop mission essential tasks (MET)
 - Across CAESR
 - Across warfighting function
- Build exercise objectives
 - MET-based
 - Identify venue: FTX, CAX, CPX, WG, R&D Test Demonstrations
- Target exercise opportunities
- Schedule exercise
 - Develop force list
 - Request for forces
- Execute events (R&D, demonstration)
- Capture and catalogue best practices and lessons learned
- Refine and revise DOTMLPF

Key to our ability to articulate DOTMLPF change requirements will be the establishment of METs, from core or fundamental design capabilities of an organization (standardized for each unit type) to major war plan (OPLAN) METS for capabilities necessary to meet warfighting requirements.

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Once we have honed our METS, built them into our exercise or experimentation plan/objectives, execute the plan, and indentify new or improved best practices, we will consider potential DCR.



Joint Seabasing is a concept that provides a solution to the challenge of conducting joint missions across a range of operations from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. It provides for the application of Naval capabilities by leveraging joint, interagency, and multi-national efforts.

Joint Seabasing is an essential component of our nation's strategic advantage and is a capability combatant commanders are requesting. The time has come to better utilize what we currently have and prepare for emerging seabasing capabilities in order to properly facilitate the employment of joint seabasing in our future operations.

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